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Courts are not alone in wielding the responsibility and power of
constitutional interpretation. Congress and state legislatures, federal
and state executive officers, and many others act to interpret the U.S.
Constitution in their daily work, including police officers, public
school officials, and local politicians. Our divided system of democ-
ratic governance affords an opportunity for dialogue among govern-
ment officials and the electorate in a variety of forms as constitutional
law evolves. Constitutional law should be formulated in an ongoing,
long-term dialogue in which judges, legislators, and other constitu-
tional actors participate actively in shaping our understanding of the
Constitution's protections and limitations.'
Rhetoric about judicial activism abounds in modem political cam-
paigns. Bar associations and judicial organizations regularly voice
concern about the need to protect judges from encroachments on judi-
cial independence. Judicial independence is threatened from some
quarters, as particular judges are targeted for unpopular decisions
with death threats, through email or media campaigns, or by calls for
recall or impeachment proceedings. For example, great furor and at-
tention was generated by decisions of Judge Harold Baer in New
York for criminal rulings perceived as protecting defendants too ex-
tensively. Judge Alfred Goodwin in California was lambasted by pub-
lic officials and others for authoring the opinion striking "under God"
from the Pledge of Allegiance, based on the court's reading of Estab-
lishment Clause precedent. Judicial independence is threatened sys-
temically as well, through failure to provide sufficient funding for
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I am grateful to the
law review editors at Case Western Reserve for organizing this conference on judicial inde-
pendence and extending me an invitation to speak with such an esteemed group of scholars.
I For further descriptions of constitutional dialogue, see sources cited in Lisa A. Klop-
penberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 314-17 nn.98-115 (1996).
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judicial operations, highly politicized federal judicial confirmation
processes, and the increasing cost of judicial campaigns in many
states. As both Democrats and Republicans work overtly to elect
judges or gain confirmation for judges who share their views, when
they charge judges who do not share their views with activism, they
demonstrate that both politically "conservative" and "liberal" judges
can be labeled activist.
One way in which many judges try to deflect political pressure
from their courts, and thus promote judicial independence, is by
resorting to avoidance techniques. The avoidance doctrine urges
judges to avoid decision of "unnecessary" constitutional questions. It
encompasses a number of tools, from justiciability barriers and
abstention doctrines that bar courts from ruling on the merits of
constitutional issues to minimalist approaches to constitutional
decision-making if the merits of an issue are reached.2 Sometimes
constitutional rulings are merely delayed; sometimes they are
completely avoided. Many judges and scholars have praised
avoidance as a way to preserve judicial independence and promote
deference to other constitutional decision-makers.3 The avoidance
doctrine is longstanding and has often been praised by the Rehnquist
Court as a foundational principle of constitutional adjudication for
federal courts. Many state courts employ similar presumptions about
avoidance.
After canvassing briefly some of the costs of avoidance, which are
too often overlooked, this essay questions some of the rationales prof-
fered for avoiding decisions of controversial constitutional issues.
When courts employ avoidance techniques, do they actually act in a
less aggressive manner and thereby promote judicial independence?
And, even if some avoidance techniques foster judicial independence
in the short run, do they foster a vibrant long-term role for the judici-
ary as an independent interpreter of the Constitution?
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AVOIDANCE
The justifications for avoidance can be grouped into a few catego-
ries, based on Justice Brandeis's famous Ashwander formulation of
2 See generally LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE (2001).
3 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) [hereinaf-
ter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH]; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT (1975) [hereinafter BICKEL, MORALITY]; CASS R. SuNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME
(1999); Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185
(1992); Hon. Richard A. Posner, Foreward: A Political Court, 119 HARv. L. REV. 31 (2005).
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1936.4 Perhaps the most understandable and defensible justification is
the proposition that federal courts should avoid unnecessary constitu-
tional questions to promote federalism and separation of powers.
Thus, to the extent Congress or a state is charged with authority in a
particular substantive area, courts should carefully ensure the ability
of these actors to interpret the Constitution in their work by not fore-
closing options. Judicial review that invalidates another branches'
constitutional work should be a last resort due to its purportedly "deli-
cate" and "final" nature; similarly, states and other constitutional ac-
tors should be given the benefit of the doubt when possible and their
actions repudiated only when absolutely necessary.5
While deference is an important and valid stance for courts in our
multilayered democracy, it is not simple to apply. The precise dictates
of federalism and separation of powers, for example, are not clear,
making more difficult the judgment call about whether lawsaying by
a court is "necessary." These are changing areas involving difficult
constitutional and political issues as well as fairly vague and broad
principles. In recent decades, these issues have emerged as major
areas for power struggles between the federal and state governments,
businesses, and individuals, with courts delineating the scope of these
powers regularly and "mediating" these struggles. For example, the
Rehnquist Court's judicial activism is most obvious in its many
closely divided federalism rulings over the past fifteen years.6 Since
the War in Iraq, it is evident that President George W. Bush and his
advisors share a broad view of separation of powers not shared by all
judges or legislators. While avoiding constitutional issues to afford
time for some of the political battles to play out or the crises to dimin-
ish may be attractive, it entails costs for parties who must spend ex-
cessive time and expense in securing protection for constitutional
rights. Additionally, a court's invocation of an avoidance mechanism
does not always lead to greater deference to other constitutional ac-
tors or advance constitutional dialogue.'
A second set of justifications for avoidance is even more troubling.
These concerns center on the pressure placed on courts resulting from
constitutional adjudication. They include a court's credibility and
viability, and are directly linked to fears for judicial independence.
The Ashwander formulation arose in part as a response to the activism
4 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (outlining several rules
the Court developed for avoiding constitutional questions).
5 The Ashwander justifications are explored more fully in Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1035-65 (1994).
6 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 2, at ch. 7.
7 See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 71 (1995).
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of the conservative U.S. Supreme Court of the Lochner era. The fears
of political reprisal and long-term credibility or viability of unelected
Article HI judges certainly animate the general avoidance doctrine, as
captured so well in Alexander Bickel's work on the countermajori-
tarian difficulty and passive virtues.8
These concerns can be exaggerated. Courts have thrived during
much of the last century, becoming increasingly important in consti-
tutional adjudication, despite political attacks, funding battles, and
other pressures. Courts in the United States, along with courts in other
countries, have played a significant role in the development of consti-
tutional law, sometimes in socially sensitive areas, 9 without much
success by those who attempt to curb courts' authority through juris-
diction-stripping laws, budget restrictions, or other means (e.g., alter-
ing the size of the Supreme Court). Courts have made numerous deci-
sions regarding federalism, separation of powers, criminal procedure,
privacy rights, race and gender relations, sexual orientation, and relig-
ion over the past century without diminishing significantly in power
or in public perception of credibility. Thus, having courts seen as ac-
tive participants in constitutional dialogue, with robust judicial review
and input on the most socially sensitive controversies of the day, does
not clearly result in a less independent court system.
Even if fears regarding continued independence for the judiciary
are more credible than assessed here and are actually capable of forc-
ing changes on the courts, judges play an important constitutional role
in checking the majoritarian impulses of other branches or govern-
ments or politicians, who are under greater pressure than judges to
respond to the crisis du jour and majoritarian sentiments. Litigants
must sometimes bring issues to courts precisely because legislative or
executive officials have ducked a controversy for fear of retaliation at
the polls. This role is particularly apt for those judges with Article lI
protection, which does not include a good portion of the federal judi-
cial officers today, given the growth of non-life-tenured federal
judges in recent decades.10 State judges also are often called upon to
decide controversial issues because other political actors do not want
to take the heat or because someone challenges state or local govern-
ment action (including direct-democracy measures in half the states),
that are not crafted carefully or implemented with sufficient regard to
8 BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 3; BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 3.
9 See JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY (Robert Badinter & Hon. Stephen Breyer,
eds., 2004) (examining the judiciary's role in supervision of the political process).
10 For more details on the growth of federal judicial officers and the controversy surround-
ing the appropriate number of life-tenured judges, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction
as Injury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle I, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924,984-92 (2000).
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constitutional concerns. Although they do not have as much protec-
tion as federal judges, state judges also swear to uphold the law and
are expected to act impartially to advance the Constitution and appli-
cable federal and state laws. One of the most important functions of a
judge is to ensure that an individual or entity's constitutional rights
are protected against governmental overreaching.
Finally, avoidance techniques are justified by courts sometimes
because of the "paramount importance of constitutional adjudication
in our system."11 This might be a fear of foreclosing other constitu-
tional actors or a fear of issuing an unpopular decision that might
impact the court's viability. Prominent judges and scholars have ac-
knowledged the concerns or pressures on the federal courts' role in
controversies such as abortion issues or desegregation.1 2 The rights
protection function of the courts, particularly federal courts in our
democratic system, as well as the "paramount importance" of consti-
tutional adjudication should lead to less avoidance of constitutional
issues by courts, not more.
Moreover, some of the Ashwander justifications contain faulty as-
sumptions about the delicacy and finality of judicial review. Fears
that court rulings will foreclose future legislative action are often ex-
cessive, although it is admittedly hard to gauge the impact of constitu-
tional rulings and account thoroughly for all the pressure points that
cause constitutional law to change, even after the U.S. Supreme Court
has issued an authoritative decision in the area.13 Judicial review
should be viewed through a long-term lens, in which constitutional
adjudication and responsive debate, including constitutional interpre-
tation by the legislature, implementation by the executive, and
changes made by future courts, develop constitutional understandings
over time.
As a result of concerns about deference, foreclosure, and threats to
judicial independence, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed avoid-
ance techniques selectively over the past three decades and often in
categories of cases involving controversial issues or "sensitive area[s]
I Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct. of City of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
12 See, e.g., Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Re-
lation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Hon. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review: A
Practicing Judge's Perspective, 78 TEx. L. REv. 761 (2000); Posner, supra note 3; BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 3, at 111-98; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 147 (1993); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
13 See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 2001); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993). HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997); Hon. Robert A. Katz-
mann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication Between Courts and
Congress: A Progress Report, 85 GEO. L.J. 2189 (1997).
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of social policy.' 14 For example, the Court has used avoidance tech-
niques frequently in litigation involving dissident speech (notably the
Cold War cases), civil rights claims and issues of equity for women,
racial minorities, gays, lesbians, and cases involving the protection of
religious minorities. 15 Sometimes it is overt-the justices write about
political pressure on the courts; more often, the political controversy
goes unstated. The decision to avoid a constitutional issue is itself a
decision, and it is impossible to separate our analysis of the proce-
dural tool completely from our view of the merits of the underlying
constitutional questions. As judges determine whether it is "neces-
sary" to address a constitutional issue, their views of the merits are
intertwined frequently with that decision. Political pressure on courts
may influence when courts issue "minimalist" rulings, affording less
clarity and guidance to other constitutional actors. For example, in the
Ten Commandments cases of 2005,16 Justice Breyer found two fact
situations distinguishable and the Court upheld one court display of
the Commandments, but not another. Judge Posner praised this mini-
malist technique precisely because
[c]ompromise is the essence of democratic politics and hence
a sensible approach to dealing with indeterminate legal ques-
tions charged with political passion-this is Bickelian pru-
dence minus Bickelian teleology .... [T]o give a complete
victory to the secular side of the debate (or for that matter to
the religious side) could be thought at once arrogant, disre-
spectful, and needlesslesly inflammatory.
17
Again, we come to the question of necessity. When is it necessary for
the U.S. Supreme Court to decide an important social controversy
with constitutional implications at its heart?
The costs of avoiding constitutional questions are borne too often
by the poor and marginalized in our society, those most in need of
help securing protections for their constitutional rights and civil liber-
ties. In contrast, in its federalism rulings of recent decides, the Court
has not been hesitant to address other controversial constitutional
issues, holding against victims of domestic violence, state workers
who claimed discrimination and those claiming intellectual property
14 The designation comes from Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 498 (1941).
15 For multiple examples of the Court's avoidance in recent decades of socially sensitive
cases, see generally KLOPPENBERG, supra note 2.
16 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125
S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
17 Posner, supra note 3, at 102.
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rights. While the Rehnquist Court has not created a vibrant body of
equal protection law for those on the margins of our society and still
subject to serious discrimination, it did use equal protection to inter-
vene in the Bush v. Gore'8 dispute, despite a constitutional role set
forth in the Constitution for Congress in determining disputed elec-
tions. Nevertheless, Congress and the public acquiesced, and some
polling indicates that the Court's credibility was not marred signifi-
cantly by this activism.' 9
While it is impossible to delineate every choice by the Rehnquist
Court to invoke avoidance, some interesting patterns are apparent and
the Court's avoidance practices deserve further attention
II. THE AVOIDANCE CANON
This brief essay will examine only one aspect of avoidance, the
use of the canon of statutory construction to avoid "unnecessary"
constitutional decisions and centering on one example, rather than a
group of cases. The canon is a tool used to interpret statutes narrowly
when they raise "serious constitutional questions.', 20 The canon is
premised in part on deference to the legislature's role in constitutional
interpretation. Rather than invalidate troubling legislation, a court
"merely" revises the offending aspect of legislation. In theory, this
affords legislatures another opportunity to consider the constitutional
issues posed and strike a different balance between furthering its pri-
mary legislative aims and invading constitutionally protected areas.
In practice, the avoidance canon is sometimes deployed with con-
siderable aggressiveness. Many scholars provide examples of the con-
tortions that can result from using this purportedly deferential
canon.21 Some courts have used it to create shadow or phantom con-
stitutional norms rather than enforce clear, existing precedent at the
"8 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
19 Lanny Sommese, Who Can Check the President?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 56-57.
20 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme
Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1
(1996) (examining several groups of First Amendment cases, from the Cold War era to the
1990s).
21 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 PA. L.
REV. 1007 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992); Phillip P.
Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory,
and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397 (2005);
Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on Constitutional
Interpretation, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 481 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Schauer, supra note 7.
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time of the legislative enactment.22 Of course, a court's view of the
scope of constitutional protection will sometimes differ from the leg-
islature's reading of the Constitution. Where there is room for de-
bate-as there often is in constitutional interpretation-the court can
use the canon to enforce its view of the constitutional concerns, de-
veloping constitutional law through dicta or on statutory interpreta-
tion grounds without clear demarcation of constitutional boundaries.
The Supreme Court has sometimes used the canon to develop phan-
tom norms, and then, in later cases, chide other governmental actors
for not avoiding a constitutional "danger zone so clearly marked"
when the danger was only mentioned at a sub-constitutional level;
that is, as a potential constitutional problem, in its earlier precedent.23
That approach is not significantly different from direct constitutional
lawsaying in the first instance, at least in terms of deference to other
constitutional actors and the linked argument about promoting judi-
cial independence.
In some circumstances, courts have used the canon to rewrite stat-
utes to contravene fairly clear legislative intent, undercutting the law
significantly without invalidating it. Courts essentially "remand" a
controversial law to the legislature. The legislature may not have the
time or political will to reconsider the issue. Thus, while the canon is
advanced as a rich mechanism for dialogue between courts and legis-
lature on constitutional issues, it is often used as a way of deciding
constitutional issues on the merits without a full airing of the issue,
without sufficient reasoned elaboration, and without purporting to
rule on the merits at all.
In 1994, the Court applied the canon to uphold a congressional act
aimed at protecting children from exploitation in pornographic mate-
rials.24 The Court read a scienter requirement into the law to avoid
perceived constitutional problems, requiring that the government
show that a defendant knew he was using a child under a specific age
in the pornographic material.25 Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented,
finding those constitutional doubts baseless, and accusing the major-
ity of rewriting the statute and eviscerating legislative intent. 26 They
emphasized that the Court's precedent did not clearly demarcate the
danger zone.
22 See Motomura, supra note 21; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21.
23 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
24 United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
25 Id. at 69.
26 Id. at 80-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The dissenters argued that it would be better to invalidate the act
entirely, affording Congress more leeway to rewrite the law.27 The
majority might have been attempting to avoid some political heat by
upholding the law, which was aimed at protecting children from
exploitation. But it did make a decision about the content of
constitutional law, at least at a quasi-constitutional level, and that
interpretation would have a real impact on prosecution of
pornography purveyors. The majority's interpretation conflicted
clearly with congressional intent, examining the text, history, and
context of the enactment. Thus, the Court's use of the canon was
hardly deferential. Did avoiding the constitutional question through
statutory construction advance judicial independence? If so, it seems
to do so by elevating form over substance, perhaps to avoid media
and public scrutiny of the Court's role in making it tougher to
prosecute those who exploit children. If the outcome is consistent
with your reading of the Constitution, you might prefer that the Court
memorialize that understanding with a definitive constitutional ruling.
If you disagree that the scienter requirement should apply when
children under sixteen are used in pornography, the Court's quasi-
constitutional ruling forecloses Congress in much the same way a
constitutional ruling would limit congressional options.
How troubling is the use of the canon in contrast to other avoid-
ance techniques? When the U.S. Supreme Court avoids constitutional
questions through the use of justiciability or abstention doctrines, as it
did in the Pledge of Allegiance case recently,28 it refuses to deal with
the merits of the constitutional issues implicated, at least for the pre-
sent moment. In contrast, the Court's use of the canon can provide
some guidance on the justices' leaning on a given issue. If it is a
lower federal court or state court, the ruling has less precedential
force when other judges or panels consider the same issue. Arguably,
this leaves more room for dialogue on issues that the judges perceive
raise constitutional questions, analogous to the idea that states might
sometimes function as laboratories for democracy. Judge Posner has
characterized Professor Bickel's avoidance project as promoting a
"coercive" kind of dialogue. 29 "It would be a Bickelian Court's hope
that the legislators would have their eyes opened by the Court's tuto-
rial or that reenactment would founder on the intertial difficulty of
enacting legislation., 30 In terms of promoting dialogue, the canon
affords less clarity as the Court shapes constitutional law. The Court
27 Id. at 85-87.
28 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1 (2004).
29 Posner, supra note 3, at 82.
30 Id. at 82-83.
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could step away from the ruling, or alter the boundaries of the "dan-
ger zone" identified in future cases. Professor Murchison has said the
canon advances a rather "muffled" and "tentative" dialogue, with a
"blend of indirection, impatience, pause and reply," but nevertheless
concludes that it is important and useful.3 '
Courts will never reject avoidance techniques completely; judges
need some flexibility in adjudication. The Rehnquist Court suggests
that federal courts should pause at the outset of a ruling and ask
whether addressing a constitutional question is truly necessary. In-
stead, courts should reverse that presumption, considering carefully
the costs of avoidance to litigants and others before avoiding deci-
sion.32 They should also examine whether the rationales for avoidance
are promoted by deploying the canon. Would deference and judicial
independence truly be advanced? Direct repudiation by a court, if it
perceives clear constitutional problems with legislation or executive
practice, is a better way to protect constitutional rights.
It need not foreclose all dialogue. The level of foreclosure de-
pends, of course, on the level of court. The impact of one trial judge's
ruling in Ohio is less than the impact of the Supreme Court invalidat-
ing congressional legislation, at least in terms of finality. Yet it is also
important for federal and state appellate courts not to avoid contro-
versial and important constitutional issues reflexively. Again, claims
of finality are often overstated. Even if the Supreme Court does void a
federal enactment, the President can use his bully pulpit to foster pub-
lic opinion and can nominate justices and judges more deferential to
the executive or congressional readings of the Constitution. Congress
can pursue other avenues to promote its legislative aims, bringing
public attention to bear through hearings, speeches by members, etc.
States are already responding vigorously, for example, to the Supreme
Court's recent eminent domain ruling.33
In many instances, there appears to be a great gulf between the jus-
tifications for avoidance (e.g., deference to other constitutional actors)
and the actual effects of avoidance and judicial review. Is avoidance
truly promoting judicial independence? It is difficult to see how the
Court's use of the canon in the child pornography case, that is using
the avoidance canon to rule at a sub-constitutional level rather than
engage in direct lawsaying, significantly enhances judicial independ-
ence. Is it necessary to preserve judicial independence? Justice
Breyer, mindful of the primacy of legislative decision-making, dis-
31 Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance
Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 85, 169 (1995).
32 For more details on this proposed analysis, see Kloppenberg, supra note 20, at 90-93.
33 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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cussed the need for an independent judiciary recently. He asserted
that emerging democratic societies see a need for an independent ju-
diciary to help secure basic liberties.
[An] independent judiciary may protect them by helping
gradually to develop among citizens and legislators liberty-
protecting habits based in part upon their expectation that lib-
erty-infringing laws will turn out not to be laws. And such
protection might seem particularly necessary in a new democ-
racy or one with a highly diverse citizenry or sizeable minor-
ity groups. That independent judiciary may also protect
through the kind of force.., that a court can bring to bear
when, faced with a law that clearly violates a constitutional
provision, that court says "no.'34
In many ways, his advice is sound for preserving judicial inde-
pendence in our democracy as well.
34 Breyer, supra note 12, at 774.

